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Summary
This dissertation deals with negotiation behavior as a function of the negotiators'
frame -- their conception of their potential own outcomes as gains or as losses
(Bazerman, L983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Negotiators with a gain frame see
their potential own outcomes in positive terms and evaluate their concessions as
decreases in their gains. Negotiators with a loss frame, in contrast, see their
potential own outcomes in negative lerms and evaluate their concessions as
increases in their losses (Bazerman, 1983; Kahneman, L992).
A review of research dealing with effects of the <lwn gain or loss frame on
the negotiator's own cognition and behavior shows that because losses are more
aversive than equivalent gains are pleasing, negotiators with a loss frame have
relatively stronger concession aversion. Consequently, loss frame negotiators
demand more, concede less and settle less easy than negotiators with a gain frame
(Carnevale, Gentile & De Dreu, 1992;De Dreu, L992; Kahneman, 1992).
In an attempt to augment this past research, a more interpersonal perspective
on frames is proposed. It is assumed that (a) following iaformation search prior
to negotiation, negotiators may have foreknowledge about their opponent's
reference outcome and concomitant gain or loss frame (cf. Russo & Schoemaker,
1989), and (b) during negotiation, disputants may exchange information about
their own frame: they may communicate their frame (cf. Kahneman, 1992; Neale
& Bazerman, L985, 1991). No prior research investigated the impact of
foreknowledge about the opposing negotiator's frame, or dealt with the effects of
the opponent's communicated frame.
The primary focus of the laboratory experiments reported in Chapter 2, 3
and 4 was on the negotiator's own cognition and behavior as a function of own
frame, opponent's communicated frame, and their interactions. In computer-
simulated buyer-seller negotiations, the subject was always the seller and was led
to believe that s/he negotiated the transaction of three issues with another subjects
who assumed the role of buyer. In fact, the buyer was a preprogrammed
computer. Subjects either negotiated net profit (own gain frame), or expenses
that would cut into their gross outcome (loss frame); the objective outcomes were
identical in both conditions. The opponent's communicated frame was
manipulated by messages the buyer sent to the subject on each round of the
negotiation (six in total). In the other's communicated gain frame condition, the
buyer sent messages evaluating the buyer's own outcomes as gains (e.g., "This
concession means a big decrease in my gains"), whereas the messages evaluated
the buyer's own outcomes as losses in the opponent's communicated loss frame
condition (e.g., "This concession means a big increase in my losses"). The
(preprogrammed) buyer always started the negotiation with a first offer, and a
frame-related message, whereupon the subject responded with a counter-offer
and, if s/he wanted, a written message. This procedure continued for six rounds,
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whereupon the negotiation was interrupted and a questionnaire was administered.
Based on the assumption that negotiators reciprocate other's comnrunication
(cf. Putnam & Jones, 1982) and converge toward simiiar definitions of their
situations (Giles & Smith, 1979; Lewicki & Litterer, L985), the frame adoption
hypothesis predicted that negotiators adopt other's communicated frame. Hence,
other's communicated loss frame induces a loss frame with its concomitant strong
concession aversion, whereas other's communicated gain frame induces a gain
frame with its concomitant weak concession aversion, low demands and large
concessions. Because loss framed negotiators are more focused on their own
outcomes than gain framed negotiators, they may be less sensitive to the
opponent's features, characteristics and behaviors (De Dreu, Emans and Van de
Vliert, 1992a; De Dreu, Lualhati & McCusker, in press; cf. Taylor, 1991). Hence,
the predicted frame adoption was expected to occur especially when negotiators
themselves have a gain rather than loss frame.
The results of the research reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 yielded good
support for the frame adoption hypothesis. Negotiators placed higher demands
and made larger concessions when their opponent communicated a loss frame
rather than a gain frame. Also, they communicated a loss frame more frequent
when their opponent communicated a loss frame, and a gain frame more frequent
when their opponent communicated a gain frame. This frame-adoption effect was
as expected stronger when subjects themselves had a gain rather than loss frame.
Also, as shown in Chapter 4, when opponent's communicated frame was
incongruent with foreknowledge about other's frame (gain--loss or loss--gain), the
effects of other's communicated frame dissipated. This suggests that the frame
adoption effect is due to central and systematic rather than peripheral and
heuristic processing of other's communicated frame.
The studies reported in Chapter 3 dealt with the relationship between
communicated frames reflecting the evaluation of the own outcomes, and
communicated cooperativeness or competitiveness, reflecting the interpersonal goals
the communicator pursues (cf. Rubin & Brown, 1975). In Study 2, it was found
that the negotiators' frame is indeed reflected in their communicated frame, as
well as in their communicated cooperativeness, but that the relation between the
latter two variables was nonsignificant. Study 3 examined whether the frame
adoption effect was independent of the opponent's communicated
cooperativeness. Results showed that opponent's communicated frame affects
behavior as predicted in the frame adoption hypothesis, but did not affect the
negotiator's own communicated cooperativeness. Other's communicated
cooperativeness, in contrast, affected the own communicated cooperativeness but
not the own communicated frame. It is concluded that the communicated frame
dealing with the perception of own outcom€s is independent of the communicated
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In the experiment in Chapter 4 it was also predicted that because losses loom
larger than equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), other's concessions
would loom larger when the other has a loss frame (and other's concessions
increase other's losses), rather than a gain frame (and other's concessions
decrease other's gains). Hence, the opponent would be seen as more cooperative
when the opponent has a loss rather than a gain frame. Following the negotiation
literature (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), it was also predicted that the more
cooperative the other was seen (in the case of other's loss rather than gain
frame), the higher the own demands and the smaller the own concessions (i.e.,
mismatching). The results supported both suppositions: other's loss frame made
the other appear more cooperative, and led to higher own demands than other's
gain frame. It is concluded that foreknowledge about the opponent's gain or loss
frame makes the other appear less, or more cooperative, respectively.
Taken together, this dissertation underscores the validity and importance of
an interpersonal perspective on negotiator frame. The studies consistently show
that because losses loom larger and are more aversive than equivalent gains,
negotiators are influenced by their own frame, foreknowledge about other's frame,
the other's communicated frame, and their interactions. Given the conclusions
outlined in the preceding paragraph, it is interesting to note that professional
negotiators often try to convince their opponent that they have a loss perspective
(Neale & Bazerman,1991). This dissertation shows that such a strategy might be
very counter-productive. Conveying a loss frame induces a loss frame in the
opponent, and enhances other's tendency to mismatch one's apparent larger
concessions. Conveying a loss frame thus increases other's concession aversion
and may lead to escalation rather than de-escalation of the conflict.
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